and the distribution of digital products.
The Quantum Apocalypse: Your Encryption Will Fail And Even Your Bitcoin Will Be At Risk
\ Post-quantum cryptography is five years away.
\ No need for alarm, the experts say.
\ Start adopting post-quantum cryptographic techniques - but no rush.
\
WRONG!\
Why Information Security Has Never Been More At Risk\ There are thousands of secret, encrypted documents online.
\ Hackers have access to nearly every protected server in the world.
\ Most of these documents are secured with 2048-bit RSA or similar strength AES.
\ That gives us confidence, right?
\ That’s what the hackers want you to think!
\ There is an insidious strategy at work here.
\ It’s called SNDL - or Store Now, Decrypt Later.
\
Store NowAccess every protected server you can find—industrial, corporate, espionage, legacy.
\ Everything that no one was supposed to know.
\ Encrypted with today’s top-of-the-line encryption.
\ Completely safe—today.
\ Hold these documents in a safe server in your network, air-gapped technologies applied.
\ Wait as long as it takes for encryption-breaking cryptographic techniques to be available through quantum computing.
\
Decrypt Later\ And once quantum computing reaches the 10,000 qubit threshold (error-free or error-tolerant) -
\ Crack every 2048-bit RSA and 512-bit AES file with ease!
\ It might be 2027
\ It might be 2030.
\ But I’m guessing no government wants all its secrets exposed to the public!
\
\ If I were an enemy to the USA, UK, or the EU-
\ Or if I were a Russian or Chinese hacking group -
\ I would be crawling all the highly protected servers and extracting the most top-secret files of every country.
\ I would hold it in secure facilities, protected by air-gapped encryption.
\ And maybe, in 2028 (just guessing), when quantum computing could break 2048-bit RSA -
\ Decrypt all of the encrypted files with quantum computers.
\ And to maximize the damage, make them public online.
\ Everything that Edward Snowden and Julian Assange have done would be like peanuts compared to this scoop!
\
This is Why Post-Quantum Cryptography Must Be Implemented Today - Worldwide!\ Every encrypted file is at risk.
\ If a hacker can access it and extract them today -
\ They can decrypt them within a decade (at most) with quantum computers.
\ This is so obvious that I can’t understand why everyone does not recognize this danger.
\ But what options do we have for post-quantum cryptography?
\
SOTA Post-Quantum Cryptography Available Today\ Perplexity.ai generated this quoted section:
\
As of late 2024, NIST has ratified three primary post-quantum cryptographic algorithms:
\
- ML-KEM (FIPS 203): This algorithm, formerly known as CRYSTALS-Kyber, is designed for key encapsulation mechanisms. It is noted for its efficiency and smaller key sizes, making it suitable for general encryption purposes.
\
- ML-DSA (FIPS 204): This algorithm, previously known as CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM, serves as a digital signature standard. It is based on lattice-based cryptography and is expected to be widely adopted due to its strong security assurances.
\
- SLH-DSA (FIPS 205): Known as SPHINCS+, this stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm acts as a backup for ML-DSA. It employs a different mathematical approach, enhancing resilience against specific types of attacks.
\ Additionally, a fourth standard based on the FALCON algorithm is anticipated to be finalized soon, further expanding the options available for secure communications in a post-quantum world.’
\
Challenges facing Post Quantum Cryptography\ However, current PQC faces several challenges:
\
- They have just been developed, so they lack the long periods of testing that other cryptographic standards have.
- They require a lot of computing power to be effective. This is inefficient considering the huge volume of data to be encrypted
- They must be interoperable with current security standards. This is a thorny problem for researchers.
- Some research suggests that current PQC standards are vulnerable to new attacks that could effectively capture the secret key through side channels.
- Migrating completely to PQC is costly and time-consuming. The economic costs are huge.
- They require standardization and certification. That will require further testing and research.
\
\
ConclusionThis is the biggest, most critical problem facing information security today.
\ Extracting US DoD documents is a piece of cake for some hacking groups online.
\ Practical, Standardized, Certified, Post-Quantum Cryptography must be developed - and fast!
\ It has to be tested.
\ It has to be verified.
\ It has to be standardized.
\ And it has to be implemented worldwide.
\ Until then - Store Now, Decrypt Later is the modus operandi for all hacking groups to completely expose the secrets of any government worldwide.
\ The importance of this problem cannot be overemphasized.
\ The PQC systems of today must be built with the quantum computing systems of 2030 in mind.
\ Otherwise, the secrets of every government could be compromised as soon as powerful quantum computers are developed.
\ This is one of the most pressing problems of today.
\ And it is still unresolved.
\ I hate to end on such a depressing note, but my opinion piece has to reflect reality.
\ Every day that passes, more and more US classified documents end up in Russian or Chinese long-term storage servers.
\ We. Have. Run. Out. Of. Time!
\
\
References\
- https://www.cellcrypt.com/post/quantum-computing-vs-classical-encryption-understanding-the-store-now-decrypt-later-threat
- https://www.sectigo.com/resource-library/who-are-nists-post-quantum-algorithm-winners
- https://www.secure-ic.com/blog/physical-attacks/interview-about-side-channel-attacks/
- https://www.secure-ic.com/blog/overcoming-challenges-in-the-integration-of-post-quantum-cryptography/
- https://heqa-sec.com/blog/the-5-most-significant-challenges-facing-quantum-cryptography/
- https://www.thebrighterside.news/post/in-a-global-first-quantum-computers-crack-rsa-and-aes-data-encryption/
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:::info All Images AI-Generated by Microsoft Designer at this link: https://designer.microsoft.com/home
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